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I. INTRODUCTION
Jokes and negative stereotypes about lawyers abound, suggesting
low levels of honesty and morality. One commentator has suggested a
reason for this:
[T]he joke rings true to a lot of people because of what many
lawyers in this country-including many at the top of the
profession-do for their clients: bend, distort, conceal, cover up,
obfuscate, or misrepresent the facts, in ways that are
simultaneously (1) regarded by ordinary people as just plain
dishonest, and (2) defended by many lawyers and legal experts
as embodying the finest traditions of the bar and of legal ethics
in our adversary system.'
The last twenty years have produced increasing attention to the
psychological and social effects of law school on lawyers and lawyers'
ethics, although this concern has existed for a much longer time. In a
recent study, Granfield and Koenig found that law school did not
prepare young lawyers for the recurring conflicts produced by
''remaining a moral human being while simultaneously upholding the
ethical obligations associated with the legal profession... ,,2 In an
empirical study, meant to focus on how attorneys experienced ethical
issues within their practices, these authors found that the training did
1. Stuart Taylor, Taking Issue, 18 LEGAL TIMES 25 (1995).
2. R. Granfield & T. Koenig, It's Hard to be a Human Being and a Lawyer: Young
Attorneys and the Confrontation with Ethical Ambiguity in Legal Practice, 105 W. VA. L.
REV. 495, 496-97 (2003).
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not provide "moral sensitivity and moral judgment"3 and suggests that
ethics courses did not consider the question of "moral motivation."
The failure to develop "moral motivation" may be inferred from the
responses of a number of participants who, when faced with conflicts
between moral values and professional values, chose professional
values as the default position, insulating them from having to
determine whether those values were a sufficient moral motivation.
Granfield and Koenig discuss the various critiques of law school ethics
education and suggest some changes that we will discuss later in this
article.!
Another study of law students at two different law schools found,
consistent with earlier studies, that students show a decline in
endorsement of intrinsic values, "moving away from community
service values and towards appearance and image values."5 These
findings are consistent with earlier studies showing declines in law
students' preference for what may be called altruistic law practice, and
generally the findings are consistent with the common stereotypes of
amoral lawyers.6
The critique of lawyers' moral judgment and the failure of law
schools to produce lawyers who exhibit good moral judgment is a
perennial theme in these studies.7 The lawyer's traditional defense, a
seemingly amoral stance, has been to justify it as being moral because
of the role of the lawyer in society.8 Commentators like Roger
Cramton, David Luban, Thomas Shaffer, Deborah Rhode, and others
have criticized this defense of traditional lawyer role morality. Among
other critiques, these commentators claim that the role justification is
weak, even if valid,9 or that lawyers cannot avoid dealing with and
3. Id. at 520.
4. Id.; R. Granfield & T. Koenig, The Fate of Elite Idealism: Accommodation and
Ideological Work at Harvard Law School, 39 Soc. PROBS. 315 (1992).
5. L. Krieger & K. Sheldon, Does Legal Education Have Undermining Effects on
Law Students: Evaluating Changes in Motivation, Values, and Well-Being 37 (2003)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).
6. R. GRANFIELD, MAKING ELITE LAWYERS: VISIONS OF LAW AT HARVARD AND
BEYOND (1992); R.V. STOVER & H.S. ERLANGER, MAKING IT AND BREAKING IT: THE
FATE OF PUBLIC INTEREST COMMITMENT DURING LAW SCHOOL (1989).
7. James R. Elkins, Symposium on Ethics, Lawyer Ethics: A Pedagogical Mosaic, 14
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 117 (2000); R.C. Cramton, The Ordinary
Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1978).
8. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); Stephen
L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics
of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral
Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
9. LUBAN, supra note 8.
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taking stances on moral issues, if only by ignoring them. ° One can
also raise the question of whether the reliance on role morality as a
justification for all actions taken by lawyers, otherwise considered
immoral, is a sign that the profession's ethics are an inhibitor of full
moral development. Paul Tremblay has written that while the project
of moral activism among legal ethics teachers has won the day, it has
been largely futile in raising the level of moral quality among
lawyers."
Additionally, over the last twenty years, the population of women
has increased from a mere fraction of the law school population to
approximately half. In the midst of these changes, critical feminist
thinkers and others in legal academia began to ask again about the
effects of law school and the profession at large upon women.12
This paper examines the moral judgment of law students in each
of the three years of law school, and considers whether there is a
difference in the moral judgment of male and female law students.
Further, this paper relates moral judgment to students' preference for
certain altruistically-oriented public interest jobs.
II. DEFINING AND MEASURING MORAL JUDGMENT
A. Morality is Multifaceted
Social science literature explains that, from the point of view of
social and developmental psychology, morality is a complex
phenomenon. For example, Rest argues that there are four
interrelated and interacting components involved when we ask the
question "What must happen in order for a person to behave
morally?"'3 First, one must perceive relevant moral concerns in the
10. Deborah L. Rhode, Teaching Legal Ethics into the Valley of Ethics: Professional
Responsibility and Education Reform, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 139 (1995).
11. Paul R. Tremblay, 2002 Symposium: The Ethics of Litigation; Moral Activism
Manqu6, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 127 (2002).
12. C.L. Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Woman's
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 3 (1985); C.F. Epstein, Faulty Framework:
Consequences of the Difference Model for Women in the Law, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 309
(1990); C.F. EPSTEIN, WOMEN IN LAW (Univ. of Illinois Press 1993).
13. J.R. Rest, The Major Components of Morality, in MORALITY, MORAL
BEHAVIOR, AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT at 24-40 (W. Kurtines & J.L. Gewirtz eds.,
1984); J.R. REST AND D.F. NARVAEZ, MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PROFESSIONS:
PSYCHOLOGY AND APPLIED ETHICS (1994); D. Narvaez & J.R. Rest, The Four
Components of Acting Morally, in MORAL DEVELOPMENT: AN INTRODUCTION, at 385-99
(W. Kurtines & J.L. Gewirtz eds., 1995).
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situation (moral sensitivity); this might also be labeled "moral
perception." Next, one must put those concerns together into an
adequate, mature judgment about what is right or wrong (moral
judgment). Further, if one perceives and judges well, one must still
place moral values above other values relevant to the situation, thus
effectively deciding to do the moral act (moral motivation). Finally,
one must effectively implement the decision to act morally, through
perseverance, effective problem solving, etc. (implementation skills)."
While there is research relevant to each of these components,
most research has focused on moral judgment and the factors that
facilitate or inhibit its high level development. Moral judgment is also
the component of morality that has been measured most adequately.
Further, this component of morality is ideal for an educational context
because it is highly cognitive in orientation. For these reasons, this
paper focuses on the component of moral judgment, though some in
the profession (i.e. Granfield) would also be concerned about law
students' levels of moral sensitivity or moral motivation.
B. The Defining Issues Test
To measure moral judgment among law students, we used the
revised version of the Defining Issues Test.15 This objective measure
of moral judgment is based on Lawrence Kohlberg's research and
theory about moral development and on hundreds of hours of in-
depth interviews with people about their moral reasoning in moral
dilemmas. 6 Any test that purports to measure a psychological quality
(whether moral judgment, some dimension of personality, evaluation
of quality of teaching, or whatever) must be characterized by both
reliability and validity. That is, the test must measure consistently and
it must measure what it is supposed to measure and not measure what
it is not supposed to measure. The DIT and the DIT-2 meet both of
these criteria quite well." Further, the DIT has been used successfully
to assess moral judgment in a variety of different colleges and
universities 8 and in graduate students in various professional areas
14. The four interrelated and interacting components for morality are Moral
Sensitivity, Moral Judgment, Moral Motivation, and Implementation Skills.
15. The Defining Issues Test is also referred to as DIT and DIT-2.
16. A. COLBY & L. KOHLBERG, THE MEASUREMENT OF MORAL JUDGMENT:
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND RESEARCH VALIDATION (1987).
17. J.R. REST, DEVELOPMENT IN JUDGING MORAL ISSUES (1979).
18. S.P. McNeel, College Teaching and Student Moral Development, in MORAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE PROFESSIONS: PSYCHOLOGY AND APPLIED ETHICS, at 27-49
(JR. Rest & D.F. Narvaez eds., 1994).
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(medicine, dentistry, law, nursing, and accounting).19
1. How the DIT-2 Measures Moral Judgment
The DIT-2 consists of five story dilemmas, each of which uses the
following procedure. First, the respondent recommends a course of
action for the central character. For example, in the Famine dilemma
(the DIT-2 version of the famous Heinz dilemma), respondents must
recommend whether or not Mustaq should steal food from a rich man
in order to save the lives of his family. The rich man has been
hoarding food in order to sell it later at a huge profit when prices have
gone up. At the same time, Mustaq's family has been trying
everything to get adequate food, but they are near starvation. Hence,
Mustaq's choice is to either steal the food, or his family members
might die.
The test then requires respondents to rate the importance of
twelve specific reasons that might lie behind their recommendation of
what action Mustaq should take. Note that the reasons, not the action
itself, determine how morally advanced the person's moral reasoning
is. The central purpose of the test is to assess moral reasoning, not
intended actions, though the results are correlated in expected ways
with action recommendations. The twelve specific reasons used in
each of the DIT stories come originally from the transcripts of
hundreds of in-depth interviews in which people discussed similar
dilemmas and responded to interviewer probes. Thus, the reasons
reflect the types of reasons people spontaneously generate when
considering how to act in the specific dilemma situations.
Each of the twelve reasons reflects a specific category of moral
rationale, some of which are better reasons than others. For example,
in the Famine dilemma, a concern that Mustaq might get caught if he
steals the food reflects a concern for his own welfare. Of course,
Mustaq's physical well-being is important to his family, but if this
reason is ranked as more important than more basic moral
considerations then it is likely that the reasoning reflects a self-
focused concern for one's own welfare. Other reasons reflect a
concern for pleasing his family, or other people close to him, or for
living within a system and doing what the law requires. Such reasons
are important and understandable-we all use them at times.
However, they are inadequate as moral justifications for actions. For
19. J.R. REST AND D.F. NARVAEZ, MORAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE PROFESSIONS:
PSYCHOLOGY AND APPLIED ETHICS, supra note 13.
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example, pleasing other people or even obeying the law, can
constitute doing an unjust thing.' As many western philosophers have
pointed out, "the moral point of view" transcends self-, other-, group-
focused, or law-focused reasons for action. When we say "that's
wrong" we mean wrong in some global, universal sense, not just "I,
my friends, my group, or society do not approve of that." Thus, on the
DIT, some of the twelve reasons reflect abstract universal principles
such as justice, the ultimate value of all human life, the sanctity of
human personhood. Such reasons reflect "the moral point of view"
that applies equally to all people.2'
An example of a principled reason on the DIT-2 version of the
Famine dilemma is a concern for whether laws are getting in the way
of the most basic claim of any member of a society. The most basic
claim of any member of a society might well be the right to life itself.
Property and money are certainly important, but life is more
important. The value of property and money derives from the value of
human life. Thus, if the law against stealing causes people to starve to
death, then things have gone badly wrong morally; when property and
money are more important than human life, society is morally
problematic. So the moral point of view would certainly place very
high value on principled (also called "postconventional")
considerations like whether laws are getting in the way of the most
basic claim of any member of a society.
The test measures the importance a person places on
postconventional reasoning by looking at how highly he or she ranks
the reasons that reflect such postconventional reasoning. Thus, the
main score, the P-Score, reflects the relative dominance of the above
kind of reasoning (called "principled reasoning" or "postconventional
reasoning") compared to self-, other-, or group-oriented reasoning. In
other words, higher P-Scores reflect more sophisticated, more morally
adequate moral reasoning.
2. Validity of the DIT
Rest summarizes a large body of evidence that supports the
validity of the DIT using six separate validity criteria." One of the six
20. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN'T WAIT
(1963).
21. REST, supra note 13; A. COLBY & L. KOHLBERG, THE MEASUREMENT OF
MORAL JUDGMENT: THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND RESEARCH VALIDATION
(1987).
22. J.R. REST, D. NARVAEZ, M.J. BEBEAU & S. THOMA, POSTCONVENTIONAL
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criteria that the DIT predicts is ethical and unethical behaviors. For
example, auditors with higher P-scores were less likely to concede to a
client's request when there was an auditor-client conflict23 and were
more likely to disclose sensitive audit findings even under conditions
of retaliation by management." In medicine, orthopedic surgeons with
few or no malpractice claims per year had higher P-scores.25 Other
examples supporting the validity of the DIT focus on students'
cheating behaviors, workers' whistle blowing behaviors, nurses'
decisions about medical care, and clinical performance ratings of
medical interns.26 Evaluated in full, the results support the claim that
the DIT P-score is a significant predictor of ethically related behavior.
III. GENDER DIFFERENCES IN MORAL JUDGMENT?
Law and its institutions are unmistakably bound up in justice-
oriented abstract thinking. During the 1980s, legal academics began to
observe more closely the slowly increasing numbers of women in
American law schools. Because of the supposed justice focus in
Kohlbergian measures of moral judgment, early discussions suggested
that Kohlbergian measures might "downscore" females, resulting in
lower measured moral judgment for females than for males. Gilligan
argued that women reason morality in terms of "caring" instead ofjustice, and that they focus on personal relationships more than on
abstract principles.27 Teachers and students of law, as well as
sociologists, realized that this would have potent implications in legal
education and practice."
While early analyses sometimes supported the prediction that
females would have lower moral judgment scores than males, it was
MORAL THINKING: A NEO-KOHLBERGIAN APPROACH (1999).
23. J.S.L. Tsiu, Auditors' Ethical Reasoning: Some Audit Conflict and Cross Cultural
Evidence, 31 INT'L J. ACCT. 121 (1996).
24. D. Arnold & L. Poneman, Internal Auditor's Perceptions of Whistle-Blowing and
the Influence of Moral Reasoning: An Experiment, Auditing, 10 J. PRAC. & THEORY 1
(1991).
25. D.C. Baldwin, Jr., E. Adamson, D.J. Self & T.J. Sheehan, Moral Reasoning,
Moral Reasoning and Malpractice: A Study of Orthopedic Surgeons (1994) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with authors).
26. REST, supra note 22, at ch. 4.
27. C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
28. Epstein, supra note 12; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 12; C.L. Menkel-Meadow,
Exploring a Research Agenda of the Feminization of the Legal Profession: Theories of
Gender and Social Change, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 289 (1989); C.L. Menkel-Meadow,
Culture Clash in the Quality of Life in the Law: Changes in the Economics, Diversification
and Organization of Lawyering, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 621 (1994).
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soon shown that the lower levels of education among women were the
true determining factor." Further, Walker found evidence that those
with high levels of principled reasoning were using both care
reasoning and justice reasoning in an integrated manner." This is
consistent with the last-published position of Kohlberg that argued
that principled moral thinking reflects both justice reasoning and care
reasoning.31 Thus, it seems likely that women in our sample would
score as high as men on the DIT, even if they tend to be reasoning
from the care orientation.
Meta-analysis of fifty-six studies using the DIT supports this
claim; overall, women tended to score slightly higher (not lower) than
men, although the gender effect was very small, accounting for less
than half a percent in the variance of P-scores.3 More recently, Rest
et al. argue that the evidence shows "that sex is a trivial variable in
accounting for DIT variance."33 Based on these findings and the
gender differences in medical, veterinary, and dental students that
tended to favor women, we expect that if there is a gender difference
in moral judgment among first year law students, it will favor
females.'
29. L.J. Walker, Sexism in Kohlberg's Moral Psychology?, in MORAL
DEVELOPMENT: AN INTRODUCTION, at 8 (W. Kurtines & J.L. Gewirtz eds., 1995).
30. L.J. Walker, B. de Vries & S.D. Trevethan, Moral Stages and Moral Orientations
in Real-Life and Hypothetical Dilemmas, 58 CHILD DEV. 842 (1987); M.J. Bebeau & M.M.
Brabeck, Integrating Care and Justice Issues in Professional Moral Education: A General
Perspective, 16 J. MORAL EDUC. 189 (1987); B. Puka, Toward the Redevelopment of
Kohlberg's Theory: Preserving Essential Structure, Removing Controversial Content, in
Handbook of Moral Behavior and Development: Vol. 1, Theory, at 373-93 (W.M.
Kurtines & J.L. Gewirtz eds., 1991) (Similarly, Puka has argued that principled reasoning
that reflects principles such as caring or utilitarianism will result in high moral judgment
scores on Kohlberg's interview measure of moral judgment. The same argument can be
made for the DIT, which was constructed using the reasoning of subjects responding to
Kohlberg's interview dilemmas).
31. L.K. Kohlberg, D.R. Boyd & C. Levine, The Return of Stage 6: Its Principle and
Moral Point of View, in THE MORAL DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN THE ONGOING DISCUSSION
BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, at 151-81 (1990).
32. S.J. Thoma, Estimating Gender Differences in the Comprehension and Preference
of Moral Issues, 6 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 165 (1986).
33. REST, supra note 22, at 116.
34. D.J. Self & M. Olivarez, The Influence of Gender on Conflicts of Interest in the
Allocation of Limited Critical Care Resources: Justice vs. Care, 8 J. CRITICAL CARE 64
(1993); D.J. Self, A.B. Pierce & J.A. Shadduck, Description and Evaluation of a Course in
Veterinary Ethics, 207 J. AM. VETERINARY ASS'N 1550, 1550-53(1995); Bebeau, supra
note 30.
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IV. POSTCONVENTIONAL MORAL REASONING
Studies have demonstrated that high levels of postconventional
reasoning reflect high valuation of other persons, commitment to
treating all people fairly, and respect for human dignity. Research on
attitudes toward human rights shows that those with high
postconventional moral reasoning have more positive attitudes
toward the human rights of unpopular or disadvantaged groups, even
over and above the level predicted by political ideology.3 5
Additionally, Long's study found that lawyers in public interest
practice had significantly higher levels of postconventional reasoning
than did those in private practice.36 Thus, it seems likely that the
importance of work in public interest or altruistic areas of legal
practice, judged by law students, is a significant predictor of moral
judgment scores. Based on several studies, we expected that political
liberalism and moral judgment would be correlated." Finally, based
on the work of Narvaez, et al. and McNeel, et al., we expected that
both political ideology and preference for altruistic law practice would
add significant power when predicting moral judgment.38
V. EXPECTED CHANGES DURING THE FIRST YEAR OF LAW
SCHOOL
A. Changes in Moral Judgment in Professional/Graduate School
While significant and strong growth in moral judgment during the
35. S.P. McNeel, J.F. Frederickson, & S.L. Granstrom, Attitudes toward Human
Rights: Moral, Religious and Political Predictors, Paper Presented at the 24th Annual
Conference of the Association for Moral Education at Dartmouth College (Nov. 1988); D.
Narvaez, I. Getz, J.R. Rest & S.J. Thoma, Individual Moral Judgment and Cultural
Ideologies, 35 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 478 (1999).
36. V.A. Long, The Moral Judgment of Attorneys: Employment in the Public or the
Private Sector and Courses in Legal Ethics, 55 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT'L 360A(1993) (published Ph.D. dissertation, American University). The results yielded a mean P-
score of 53.9 and 47.1 respectively.
37. N.P. Emler, S. Renwick & B. Malone, The Relationship Between Moral
Reasoning and Political Orientation, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1073 (1983); N.
Emler, E. Palmer-Canton & A. St. James, Politics, Moral Reasoning and the Defining
Issues Test: A Reply to Barnet et al., 37 BRITISH J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 457 (1998); Q.A.W.
Raaijmakers, T.F.M. Verbogt & W.A.M. Wollebergh, Moral Reasoning and Political
Beliefs of Dutch Adolescents and Young Adults, 54 J. SOC. ISSUES 531 (1998); J. Thoma,
D.J. Narvaez, J. Rest & P. Derryberry, Does Moral Judgment Development Reduce to
Political Attitudes or Verbal Ability?: Evidence Using the Defining Issues Test, 11 EDUC.
PSYCHOL. REV. 325 (1999).
38. Narvaez, supra note 35; McNeel, supra note 35.
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undergraduate years is common, it is uncertain whether such growth
typically continues in graduate or professional school.
Graduate/professional students typically begin at much higher moral
judgment levels than college students. Therefore, there is less "room"
for growth39 and a "ceiling effect" may minimize their growth.
The limited research on the growth in moral judgment of
graduate/professional school students supports the expectation that a
typical graduate/professional school experience will not be associated
with growth in moral judgment. Based on several of their own
longitudinal studies, Self and Baldwin conclude that both medical
school and veterinary school students show a "failure to progress in
their moral reasoning and moral development over the four years" of
their education. ' Similarly, in a cross-sectional study, Bebeau reports
that, prior to implementing an ethics curriculum in the Dental School
program at the University of Minnesota, students completing their
third year were no different in moral judgment than students
beginning their first year." While results such as these may be
discouraging, we will discuss evidence later in this article that ethics
interventions in graduate/professional programs can have powerful
effects. Nevertheless, we expected no significant mean changes in our
law students' moral judgment scores across their three years of law
school.
B. Method and Research Instruments
1. The Defining Issues Test, Revised (DIT-2)
As described in the introduction, on the DIT-2 respondents must
rate how strongly they favor a given course of action for the central
character in each of five story dilemmas. For a given story, after they
make this action rating, they proceed to rate the importance of twelve
reasons that might stand behind their preferred action choice. Finally,
the students rank order their four most important of the twelve
39. Moral Progress has been defined "the growing awareness of how people
interrelate to each other through laws, rules, roles, and institutions of society" and the
ability to exercise judgment based on moral principles. REST, supra note 22. This definition
was used to describe the movement from conventional to postconventional thinking in the
overview of this book.
40. D.J. Self & D.C. Baldwin, Jr., Moral Reasoning in Medicine, in MORAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE PROFESSIONS: PSYCHOLOGY AND APPLIED ETHICS, at 147-62
(J.R. Rest & D.F. Narvaez eds., 1994).
41. M.J. Bebeau, Influencing the Moral Dimensions of Dental Practice, in MORAL
DEVELOPMENT IN THE PROFESSIONS: PSYCHOLOGY AND APPLIED ETHICS, at 121-46.
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reasons. The measure of moral judgment used is the P-score,2 the
classical measure for this test. P-Score reflects the relative importance
given to principled (postconventional) reasons, as opposed to other
morally less adequate reasons. Additionally, a more recent DIT moral
judgment measure, the N2 score, showed highly similar results-this
paper will report only P-score results.
2. Job Importance Questionnaire
The test instrument also asked students, "Upon graduation,
which of the following areas of work would be of interest to you?"
The students rated each area from "1 = great importance" to "5 = no
importance", and scores were reversed for analyses, so that higher
scores would reflect higher job importance. The areas of legal work
we originally considered to be "altruistic" included: poverty/legal aid,
international human rights, battered women's coalition,
environmental organization, civil rights/discrimination, governmental
agency, and the public defender's office. The remaining areas of legal
work represented were corporate, intellectual property, general
practice, prosecutor's office, and family law practice.
We were interested in seeing if the areas of law practice we
conceived as altruistic would cluster together in students' rating of
importance, as they would if students tended to see them as altruistic.
To examine this concern, we analyzed the first year job importance
ratings using a multivariate statistical procedure that identifies
common "factors" or clusters in the data (Principal Components
Analysis). The results of this analysis showed that five of the areas we
had conceived as altruistic did cluster together, "loading" on the same
factor: poverty/legal aid, international human rights, battered
women's coalition, environmental organization, and civil
rights/discrimination. Only work for a governmental agency and in a
public defender's office did not cluster with this altruistic group. For
purposes of the analyses described later, we created a measure of the
extent of each student's interest in altruistic law practice by averaging
his or her ratings of the five law practice areas described above.
3. Political Ideology
This dimension was assessed using a five-point single item rating
with the response options "very liberal," "somewhat liberal," "neither
42. REST, supra note 22. The P-score is percent principled reasoning, alternatively
stated as percent post-conventional reasoning.
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liberal nor conservative," "somewhat conservative," and "very
conservative." This approach is similar to that used by other
researchers to assess this dimension and has been shown to be a valid
measure of political ideology. 3
C. Participants and Procedure
1. Beginning First Year Law Students
The Fall 1999 entering class at the University of Minnesota
School of Law responded to the revised Defining Issues Test (DIT-2)
and the job importance questionnaire during their orientation. One
hundred seventy students (81.0% of the entering class) provided data,
53.7% male and 46.3% female, with a mean age of 24.7 (range=20-
57). As to educational level, 90.9% had no degree higher than a
bachelor's degree or in some cases a professional degree. With regard
to their political views, 19.6% self-identified as "very liberal," 35.1%
as "somewhat liberal," 13.7% as "neither liberal nor conservative,"
23.2% as "somewhat conservative," and 8.3% as "very conservative."
2. Beginning Second Year Law Students
At the beginning of the second year, all second year students
received a letter asking them to retake the DIT-2, the job importance
questionnaire and the political rating. Sixty-one students (46.6% were
male) completed questionnaires, fifty-four from the previous sample
(31.8%) plus seven who had not taken the questionnaires previously.
The second year group was comparable to the first year group, except
that it included a minor overrepresentation of females and the sample
was slightly more politically liberal than the first year sample. The
general comparability of the two samples is confirmed by the fact that
when first year scores were examined as a function of whether or not
students took the second year retest, none of the variables (including
job importance variables) showed any significant differences.
3. Ending Third Year Law Students
Near the end of the last year, all third year students received a
letter asking them to retake the DIT-2 job importance questionnaire
and political rating. In addition, they also rated the same twelve jobs
43. Narvaez, supra note 35.
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in response to the following question: "Upon graduation, in which of
the following areas of work will you most likely be working?" Finally,
they ranked the four most likely areas in which they would practice
law after graduation. Sixty-four students (51.6% were male)
completed questionnaires, forty of whom had also taken the
instruments in their first and second years. This third year group
showed no significant differences from the first year group on any of
the variables-they were very comparable.
VI. RESULTS
A. Moral Judgment in Beginning Law Students: Addressing the
Unethical Lawyer Stereotype
1. Moral Judgment of Beginning Law Students
Table 1 shows average moral judgment scores (DIT P-score) for
this study and studies of several other professional groups. Our first
year law students compared favorably to other first year professional
groups; their combined mean P-score of 49.6' was higher than all but
one of the other first year professional school samples. In general, the
data disconfirmed the "unethical lawyer" stereotype, at least as it
applies to first year students.
2. Gender Differences
Table 1 also shows that our females had significantly higher P-
scores than our males, reflecting a similar tendency in two of the other
three studies which examined gender in first year professional
students.45 This six-point difference between the sexes reflects a
moderately strong gender effect. It appears that the group of law
students least likely to fit the unethical lawyer stereotype is females.
B. Moral Judgment Across the Years of Law School
Forty students took the instruments all three years, providing
only a small sample for longitudinal comparisons. The longitudinal
44. According to the results of the experiment, when evaluating the combined P-
score of 49.6, S.D. = 14.86.
45. The results of the female and male tests were 53.1 v. 47.0, F(1,162)=7.35, p=.007,
respectively.
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analyses show little in the way of significant differences; this is
probably due partly to low statistical power because of small sample
size. However, there were non-significant trends in the longitudinal
data that reflected significant differences in the cross-sectional
comparisons (the latter had greater power due to much larger sample
size). Thus, we report cross-sectional data in Table 2.
1. Moral Judgment and Gender
To begin, the results in Table 2 show that in each year, female
law students had significantly higher moral judgment scores than did
male law students.46 The mean differences of five to eight points are
substantial and statistically significant. There was also a non-
significant trend for male P-scores to become lower across the three
years. However, when we examined the longitudinal data set for only
the first two years, we found a significant effect: females showed an
increase while males showed a decrease in moral judgment scores.47
This growth in the females' moral judgment scores was largely due to
much sharper growth in moral judgment among the female students
whose first year P-scores were in the lower third as compared to the
remaining females.48 In the second year of this two-year longitudinal
data set, female law students averaged P-scores ten points higher than
males,49 a rather dramatic difference. Females who begin law school
with low P-scores tended to grow in moral judgment. Thus, in
summary, we have some limited evidence that postconventional
reasoning decreases across the years of law school for males, who
already begin at a lower level than females, while in contrast,
postconventional reasoning may increase for females. This data
definitely does not support the unethical lawyer stereotype for
females, though the results are arguably less favorable for males.
2. Moral Judgment and Political Ideology
For this analysis, liberal and very liberal students were clustered
together, as were conservative and very conservative students. The
second section of Table 2 demonstrates that, as expected, political
views were significantly and strongly associated with moral
46. The applicable results in Table 2 are as follows: (Year 1: F(1,162)=7.65, p=.006;
Year 2: F(1,58)=4.48, p=.039; Year 3: F(1,62)=4.52, p=.03 7).
47. The results of the longitudinal data for only the first two years are as follows:
F(1,51) = 4.60, p =.037.
48. The results are as follows: F (2,24) = 3.72, p = .039.
49. 55.0 v. 44.9.
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judgment."0 In the first year, being liberal politically was associated
with high P-scores (averaging about fifty-four). In contrast, being
politically conservative correlated with quite low P-scores (averaging
about forty-one). The small number of very conservative first year law
students had exceptionally low P-scores, averaging about thirty-four,
which is approximately the level typical of incoming college
freshmen.' As average scores in Table 2 show, the tendency for
liberalism to correlate with P-scores was reflected in the second and
third year data as well. 2 Thus, liberal and conservative law students
did differ rather sharply in their level of moral reasoning, with the
conservative students (especially the very conservative) being the
ones most likely to fit the unethical lawyer stereotype. As also can be
seen in Table 2, changes in moral judgment scores across the three
years were minimal for the politically liberal students, whereas the
conservative students' moral judgment tended to drop across the
three years. 3 Thus, law school education was not associated with
changing moral judgment, except that the politically conservative
students seem to have decreased somewhat in moral judgment.
3. Moral Judgment and Preference for Altruistic Law Practice
Based on students' judged importance of altruistic law practice,
we classified them as having either a low, moderate or high interest in
altruistic law practice. Table 2 shows how the moral judgment scores
of these three groups of students varied across the three years. As
predicted, higher judged importance of altruistic law practice was
associated with higher moral judgment scores in the first and third
years of law school; however, the second year data showed no
significant differences." Finally, there were no obvious, clear, or
consistent trends in moral judgment across the three years of law
school
VII. PREDICTORS OF MORAL JUDGMENT IN LAW STUDENTS
It is clear from the above results that gender, political ideology,
and preference for altruistic law practice all predict law students'
50. The association of political views to moral judgment yielded: F(2,164) = 15.62, p =
.000.
51. McNeel, supra note 18.
52. The results were as follows: F(2,52) = 5.51, p = .006, F(2,61) = 8.12, p = .001.
53. The small number of students in the middle political category mitigates against
any statements about their trend across the three years.
54. F(2,158) = 15.15, p = .000; F(2,61) = 3.23, p = .046 as compared to F(2,51) = .564.
[Vol. 45:891
MORAL JUDGMENT OF LAW STUDENTS
moral judgment scores. However, it is useful to ask whether each is an
independent predictor. In particular, it would be interesting to know
whether gender predicts moral judgment, independent of political
ideology and preference for altruistic law practice. When female
students arrive as new law students they are different from male
students, but are these differences independent of political ideology
and preference for altruistic law practice?
To answer this question, we used our first year data and a
standard multivariate statistical technique known as "multiple
regression," which asks how well we can predict an outcome variable
(P-score in our case) from one or more predictor variables. Table 3
shows the results from the analyses we describe below. First, we
predicted P-score on the basis of sex, since sex is a significant
predictor of P-score. Then we added the other two variables as
predictors (political ideology and preference for altruistic law
practice) to see if taking those variables into account allow greater
accuracy in predicting P-scores. The answer for first year law students
was a resounding "yes."55 However, even though we achieved more
accurate prediction of P-scores by taking into account all three
predictor variables, we found that sex was no longer a statistically
significant predictor. In contrast, political ideology and preference for
altruistic law practice were significant predictors, and in fact they were
of equal importance in predicting P-scores. Therefore, it appears that
the reason first year female law students are higher in moral judgment
than males is that they are more politically liberal and have a stronger
preference for altruistic law practice.
Similar analyses for the second year students show that neither
political ideology nor preference for altruistic law practice were
significant predictors of moral judgment. Finally, analyses for third
year students reveal that, as in the first year, sex dropped out as a
significant predictor of moral judgment. However, while political
ideology was a significant predictor variable, importance of altruistic
law practice was not.
In summary, across the years in law school, gender is a significant
predictor of moral judgment, but only because females are more
politically liberal. Finally, something seems to be happening during
these years in law school to diminish the importance of preference for
altruistic law practice as a predictor of moral judgment levels.
55. The multiple R increases from .205 when predicting moral judgment with gender
only to .470 when using all three predictors. This represents a large and significant increase
in predictive power.
2004]
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW
A. Moral Judgment and the Unethical Lawyer Stereotype
While moral judgment is only one aspect of morality, our results
do not confirm the unethical lawyer stereotype. Our beginning law
students, especially women, had DIT moral judgment scores
averaging about forty-nine, as high as or higher than other
comparable professional groups in graduate school. However, there is
clearly room for growth, as other professional groups have been able
to attain higher moral judgment, sometimes noticeably higher.56 The
work of Bebeau with dental students5 7 and Hartwell with law
students58 shows that an intentionally constructed curriculum can
function to enhance the moral judgment of its graduate students.
VIII. WOMEN LAW STUDENTS' LEVELS OF MORAL JUDGMENT AS
COMPARED TO MEN
As discussed in the introduction, the overall research on levels of
moral judgment finds gender differences of little or no significance. In
our study, however, first year women showed significantly higher P-
scores than did men. In the larger cross-sectional samples, this
difference was maintained and even increased somewhat in the
second and third years. In the second year longitudinal sample,
females showed an increase in P-score while males showed a decrease.
This growth in females was largely due to much sharper growth in
moral judgment among the female students whose first year P-scores
were in the lower third than among the remaining females. By the
beginning of the second year, female law students averaged P-scores
ten points higher than males. Thus, in our sample, the women
continued to show higher levels of moral judgment than did the men.
As Table 1 shows, these results are consistent with those found for
medical and veterinary students. 9 Our results are also consistent with
a recent Australian study of seven hundred law graduates. In the
56. S.P. McNeel & E.C. Vozzola, Moral Maturity in College and University Faculty:
Reasoning and Action Choices in Moral Dilemmas, Paper Presented at the 28th Annual
Conference of the Association of Moral Education, University of Illinois (Nov. 7-10, 2002)
(finding that the moral judgment average of Christian college faculty was 54.8 while the
moral judgment average of state university faculty was approximately 51.1); Rest, supra
note 13 (finding that the moral judgment average of moral and political philosophy
graduate students averaged 65.2).
57. Bebeau, supra note 41.
58. S. Hartwell, Promoting Moral Development Through Experimental Teaching, 1
CLINICAL L. REV. 505 (1995).
59. This conclusion does not however apply to dental students, though our second
and third year data add detail beyond that provided in those studies.
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study of the recent graduates' perception of values in legal dilemmas
with competing moral values, the authors state: "[t]he apparent fact
that women choose values positions which are significantly different
from those of men in many difficult professional environments and
that these positions appear on the whole to be 'better' than those of
males, ought to give particular concern to the male-dominated,
organized profession."'
Further research with groups of professional students should
examine possible explanations for the obtained gender differences
and consider how male students can be encouraged toward the
pattern shown by the female students.
IX. LEGAL EDUCATION AND MORAL JUDGMENT
Only minimal data exists relevant to whether and how law
students' moral judgment levels change during their law school
experience. Willging and Dunn reported a very small, insignificant
longitudinal increase in P-score from the beginning to the end of the
first year of law school.61 The only other relevant data comes from
cross-sectional comparisons of various samples but they suggest that
moral judgment decreases across the three years of law school. The
data from Willging and Dunn and from the present study suggest an
average P-score of about forty-nine or fifty for beginning law students.
The only data on second-year law students comes from Hartwell;
describing the P-scores of students beginning a Professional
Responsibility course, he states, "the mean score was 47.8, typical of
second-year students."62 Finally, Hartwell states that "over the years,
the mean for the 250 or so mostly third year law students I have tested
is about 43."63 The results from the males in our samples support this
pattern of slightly decreasing moral judgment during the three years
of law school. While this data is imprecise and extremely tentative,' in
combination with the "unethical lawyer" stereotype, it does suggest
60. A. Evans & J. Palermo, Australian Law Students' Perceptions of their Values:
Interim Results in the First Year-2001-of a Three-Year Empirical Assessment, 5 LEGAL
ETHICS 103, 128 (2002).
61. T. Willging & T. Dunn, The Moral Development of the Law Student: Theory and
Data on Legal Education, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 306 (1981).
62. S. Hartwell, Moral Development, Ethical Conduct, and Clinical Education, 35
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 131,166 (1990).
63. Id.
64. T.D. COOK & D.C. CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN AND
ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS (1979). This data is cross-sectional and highly
susceptible to a "selection" artifact, in which group differences reflect not longitudinal
change but only dropout or selection of different subgroups.
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the hypothesis that something may happen in law school to reduce the
moral judgment level of law students, especially of males. One other
limited longitudinal study exists regarding this effect on law students;
in her study, Chapman did not find any correlation between gender
and involvement in altruistic activities in first year law students.65 We
clearly need further and more complete longitudinal studies to
examine whether legal education in general positively, neutrally, or
negatively affects students' moral judgment, and whether our gender
differences can be replicated.
Several significant studies purport to demonstrate that law school
has little effect on beliefs, attitudes and interests among law student.6
In light of the failure of legal education to address many of the moral
concerns of newly graduated lawyers and in light of the problematic
relationship between lawyers' ethics and morality, these studies raise
the question of whether it is possible for legal education to raise the
moral judgment of law students.67
In the absence of a specific intervention, one might not
necessarily expect legal education to lead to enhanced moral
judgment. This is suggested by data from other fields. For example,
cross-sectional P-score data from the University of Minnesota dental
school showed that, prior to an ethics intervention, "our technically
oriented dental curriculum had little impact on moral reasoning
development." ' Yet, after implementing an ethics curriculum, a
longitudinal study found that senior dental students had higher P-
scores than they did as freshmen. Dentists are faced with ethical issues
similar to other health care providers. While law and morality are
both more intimately connected with guiding behavior than dentistry,
and the adversarial nature of the practice of law makes it different
from the health care professions, both professional schools have
highly technical, and often amoral approaches to their subject matter.
Legal education has been subjected to criticism because of its
65. C.D. Chapman, The Relationship between Student Involvement and the
Development of Moral Reasoning among First-Year Law Students, 60(06) DISSERTATION
ABSTRACTS INT'L 1930A (1999).
66. T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LAWYERS, LAW STUDENTS AND PEOPLE (1977);
G. Rathjen, The Impact of Legal Education on the Beliefs, Attitudes and Values of Law
Students, 44 TENN. L. REV. 85 (1976); J. Hedegard, Causes of Career-Relevant Interest
Changes Among First Year Law Students: Some Research Data, 3 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
787 (1982); J. Hedegard, The Impact of Legal Education: An In-Depth Examination of
Career Relevant Interests, Attitudes and Personality Traits Among First- Year Law Students,
4 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 791 (1979).
67. See Granfield & Koenig, supra note 4.
68. Bebeau, supra note 41, at 131.
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purported amoral character. Cramton and others following his lead
have argued that the absence of moral considerations in the standard
legal pedagogy encourages or fosters a "moral relativism tending
toward nihilism, a pragmatism tending toward an amoral
institutionalism, a realism tending toward cynicism, an individualism
tending toward atomism, and a faith in reason and democratic process
tending toward mere credulity and idolatry."69 A classic, if apocryphal,
story concerns the first year student, discussing the outcome of a
particular contracts case. The student asks the professor: "Is that
just?" and the professor replies, "We are here to study the law, we are
not concerned with justice." Others, such as Menkel-Meadow, argue
that since we cannot avoid conveying a moral stance in our teaching,
we should be conscious about fostering moral development in our
students.0
If one places these criticisms within the Kohlbergian moral
context, one might make the claim that as lawyers, the ethics of
advocacy are at best a form of conventional moral judgment and that
legal education may, in fact, make our students reason at a lower
moral level than we might prefer. If the majority of lawyers use the
professional norms as a default position, then the rules become the
norms to be maintained. The following of professional rules, without
any further moral justification, is similar to obeying an unjust law
without giving thought to the morality of the action. While following
the law or obeying professional rules as a default may be morally
correct in many, if not most cases, Granfield shows that mere role
governed (i.e. rule governed) morality does not prepare law students
for the kind of ethical and moral dilemmas that they will face in
practice.
X. ETHICS INTERVENTIONS IN LAW SCHOOL
We have found that as a group, the moral judgment of law
students remains constant over the first year of law school, although
the scores for women rise slightly while the men's scores fall. If law
students' moral judgment drops during their education, remains
constant, or even rises slightly, we would believe there to be a case for
implementing law school courses with a demonstrated ability to
enhance moral judgment level. This possibility led Willging and Dunn
69. Cramton, supra note 7, at 262.
70. C.L. Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics?, 41 J.
LEGAL EDUc. 3 (1991).
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to examine the impact on P-scores of a traditional lecture course in
ethics and professional responsibility.7 They found no significant
effect whatsoever, as can be seen in Table 4. In contrast, Hartwell
found that the teaching of ethics and professional responsibility in
small, highly interactive discussion seminars powerfully influenced P-
scores.72 Hartwell's results are consistent with other ethics
intervention studies that use intense, highly interactive approaches in
quarter- or semester-long courses.73 Each of the studies cited in Table
4, except Willging and Dunn, used a non-equivalent control group
design, in which comparable classes were taught without the key
aspects of the ethics intervention. In each case, the control groups
showed no significant change.74 Further, in two of these studies, a
follow-up experiment conducted four months later showed that the P-
score gains were maintained or even enhanced.75
It is also important to note that the effect sizes reported in Table
4 are large to very large and reflect more powerful approaches to
enhancing moral judgment than the alternative teaching methods
assessed in the moral education literature. For example, Penn shows
that his average effect size is more than twice as powerful as that
obtained using the typical educational approach of dilemma
discussion.7 1 It seems that we have available powerful methods for
enhancing moral judgment levels, and that these can be implemented
in the content of existing courses.
There is certainly no consensus in the legal academy about
whether professional responsibility courses should aspire to have any
effect on students' moral judgment or should simply teach the
professional rules and norms, or the so-called law of lawyering. Some
teachers, such as Venter and Menkel-Meadow, believe that we should
teach moral concepts in these courses and that we should aim to
develop students' moral judgment.77 Others, like Schneyer, while not
embracing an unalloyed "hired gun" approach, have questioned the
71. Willging, supra note 61.
72. Hartwell, supra note 58.
73. S.P. McNeel & J. Frederickson, Being Just in an Unjust World: Moral Education
for College Seniors, Paper Presented at the 25th Annual Conference of the Association for
Moral Education at University of Minnesota (Nov. 18-21, 1999); W.Y. Penn, Jr., Teaching
Ethics-A Direct Approach, 19 J. MORAL EDUC. 124 (1990).
74. Willging, supra note 61.
75. Hartwell, supra note 58; McNeel, supra note 73.
76. Penn, supra note 73.
77. C.M. Venter, Encouraging Personal Responsibility-An Alternative Approach to
Teaching Legal Ethics, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 287 (1996); Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 70.
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ability of the legal professoriate to consistently define and teach moral
judgment.8 The results from both Hartwell and McNeel question this
view.79 Neither are technical experts in philosophical ethics, but both
are experienced teachers who clearly have learned a great deal in the
practice of teaching. Both seem to have begun teaching the courses
evaluated in Table 4 simply in a desire to apply what they do know
and can learn from the literature.
Further, DIT data on practicing lawyers has potential relevance
here. We are aware of data from only three sources. First, Ernest &
Bebeaus° found a mean P-score of 48.3 for eighteen lawyers in a single
law practice in the northern Midwest.8' This mean is comparable to
the reported mean for practicing physicians as well as to that for
entering law students described above. Second, in an attempt to get
comparative data for accountants, Scofield surveyed a random sample
of 1,000 lawyers.' He used the three dilemma version of the original
DIT. His response rate was 18.9 percent, with one hundred sixty-nine
useable questionnaires. Scofield found a somewhat lower mean P-
score for his lawyer sample of 46.45, but he determined that women
scored higher than men. 83 Third, Long studied the comparative P.
scores for public interest and private firm lawyers. Long sent 300
requests to participate to attorneys. 8' She obtained 119 viable DITs
with the following results: private sector attorneys had a mean P-score
of 47.07,85 consistent with Scofield's results, while public sector
attorneys had a mean P-score of 53.87, 6 significantly higher, but
within the expected range.
In summary, we should be able to increase moral judgment in law
students by appropriate interventions. Paradoxically, while lawyers'
ethics are under attack, their connection with justice and the arguably
altruistic nature of at least some law practice suggests higher levels of
moral judgment. Studies of lawyers using the DIT may also be
78. Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11 (1991).
79. Hartwell, supra note 58; McNeel, supra note 18.
80. M. Ernest & M.J. Bebeau, Use of Defining Issues Test in Leadership Education,
Paper Presented at the 26th Annual Conference of the Association for Moral Education at
University of Glasgow, Scotland (July 6-10,2000).
81. This group had a S.D. = 13.8; range = 30-70.
82. S.B. Scofield, Re-examination of the Application of Cognitive Developmental
Theory to the Study of Ethics and Socialization in the Accounting Profession, 58
DISSERTATION ABSTRACrS INT'l 3597A (1997).
83. S.D. = 15.42.
84. Long, supra note 36.
85. S.D. 14.07.
86. S.D. 12.35.
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important in identifying some of the sources of their low moral esteem
and trust.
XI. CONCLUSION
Our data reveals that there is a significant positive correlation in
this group of law students between gender and moral judgment in the
first year of law school. We have also found some correlations among
moral judgment, gender, and altruistic law practice. While there have
been some shifts in the data over three years, we can conclude that
law school does not have a significant effect on the moral judgment of
law students. While we should be pleased that the law school
experience itself does not lessen the moral judgment of law students
in the aggregate, this result should also leave us with some concerns.
As the DIT data suggest, moral judgment scores do have predictive
value in ethical behavior. The authors believe that, at a minimum, we
should be enabling our students to engage in morally reflective
practice. If we are able to increase moral judgment and high level
moral reflection through specific interventions of the kind described
above, we should do so. We need to examine the way in which we
teach professional responsibility as well as the way in which we
convey the underlying assumptions of the role of moral reasoning in
the work of the lawyer. The one thing that we should hope to avoid
when it concerns moral issues in practice is the use of formal rules of
professional conduct as an unexamined default position. While an
increase in the ability of lawyers to engage in practiced moral
reflection and judgment is not a panacea, it may be a part of the
answer to the futility of the past twenty years of advocacy of moral
activism among lawyers.
The results of this study leave many questions unanswered. There
are few studies of lawyer scores using the DIT, and, except for Long,
no large-scale studies with significant and complex data on lawyer
demographics or practice area. Hartwell has shown that moraljudgment can be improved by interventions such as small intensive
seminars or clinics.8 ' Ethics and professional responsibility courses are
typically taught as large lecture courses, and as Willging and Dunn
have shown, these courses have no effect on the ordinary moraljudgment of law students.8 Therefore, the authors suggest that we
need to follow graduates into the profession to see if practice itself has
87. Hartwell, supra note 58.
88. Willging, supra note 61.
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an effect on lawyers' moral judgment. We should try to discover, for
example, whether law firm structure has the same negative association
with moral judgment as does accounting firm structure. For example,
Ponemon found that high position and length of experience in
accounting firms was negatively correlated with mean DIT score; we
should continue to conduct similar studies regarding the practice of
law.89 However, until some of these questions are answered, we can
still advocate for the positive project of increasing law students' moral
judgment.
89. L. Poneman, A Cognitive-Developmental Approach to the Analysis of Certified
Public Accountants' Ethical Judgments, 50 DISSERTATION ABSTRACTS INT'L 4007A
(1993).
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Table 1
Average Moral Judgment of Beginning Law Students and of Other
Beginning Professional Student Groups
N P% Mean
First Year Law Students
This study Overall
Males
Females
Willging & Dunn (1981)'
First Year Medical Students
Husted (1978)
Givner & Hynes (1983)
Self & Olivarez (1994)
Self & Olivarez (1993)2
Males
Females
First Year Veterinary Students
Self, Baldwin, Olivarez & Shadduck ('93) 68
Self, Pierce & Shadduck
Males 38
(in press) Females 67
First Year Dental Students
Bebeau, Rest & Yamoor (1985)
Bebeau & Brabeck (1987)
Males
Females
Graduate Level Accounting Students
Iceman, Karcher & Kennelley (1991)
Ponemon (1993)
49.61
47.00
53.10
49.50
488 50.20
108 48.70
97 44.60
312 41.80
314 47.20
45.10
39.40
43.70
40 47.20
593 47.20
184 47.60
41.80
38.60
1. These data are for 63 students who also completed a follow-up testing at the end
of their first year of law school. An additional 70 students who did not complete the end of
the year test had a near-identical mean of 50.6.
2. This is a combined group of medical and veterinary students.
S.D.
14.86
16.10
12.39
12.36
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
13.50
12.64
12.97
N.A.
N.A
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Table 2
Average Moral Judgment (P-Score) of Law Students
Across Three Years of Law School
Year in Law School
Ns for the 3 Years First Second Third
Moral Judgment (P Score) by Gender
Males 87, 27 & 33 47.10 45.20 44.90
Females 77, 33 & 31 53.40 53.50 53.30
Moral Judgment (P Score) by Political Ideology
Liberal 91, 43 & 38 54.60 52.60 53.80
Neither 23,4 & 9 47.80 57.50 51.80
Conservative 53, 13 & 17 41.40 38.20 36.70
Moral Judgment (P Score) by Interest in Altruisic Law Practice
High 58, 18 & 21 56.60 53.80 56.80
Moderate 45, 14 & 22 49.90 51.10 45.20
Low 58, 22 & 21 42.60 48.70 46.70
2004]
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Table 3
What Predicts Moral Judgment (P-scores) of Law Students?
Beta Weights for Two Multiple Regression Prediction Models
Model 1: Only Using Gender to Predict Moral Judgment
Year in Law School
Predictor First Second Third
Gender 
.205 *** .238 * .264 **
Model 2: Using Gender, Political Ideology and Judged Importance of
Altruistic Law Practice to Predict Moral Judgment
Year in Law School
Predictor First Second Third
Gender 
.032 .188 .106
Political Ideology 
.271 *** .224 .339 ***
Altruisic Law Practice Importance .257 *** .038 .156
Interpretive Notes:
Asterisks indicate significant predictors of moral judgment * = p < .10, ** = p
<.05,
*** = p < .01, The size of the beta coefficient indicates how important that
predictor is; larger beta weights indicate more powerful predictors of moral
judgment.
Ns for the three years were 155, 53 and 63 respectively.
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Table 4
Results from Ethic Intervention Courses'
Vt,,Ac.nt flrnuin
P-score
N Prp Pcit (ChnnG SDr
-gL~lIl b~J ~I .. .
Law Students
Willging & Dunn (1981) 41
Hartwell (1995) 78
MBA Students
Penn (1990)4
College Students
Penn (1990) 4
Penn (1990) 5
McNeel & Frederickson
(1999)
52.20 52.80 .060 4.49 .04
45.30 56.90 11.60 N.A. 3 .77-.973
31 39.80 52.40 12.60 13.45 .94
114 36.60 48.50 11.90 14.22 .84
57 35.20 50.40 15.20 15.20 1.00
42.0 50.7 8.7 12.54 .69
1. All studies except Willging & Dunn had non-equivalent control groups. None of
the control groups show significant change.
2. Effect Size (d) = (Post-Pre mean)/Pre S.D. Rules of thumb for interpreting d:
Small (.10-39), Moderate (.40-.69), Large (.70-.99), and Very Large (1.00 and above).
3. These data combine results from three courses reported in Hartwell. Hartwell
does not cite the S.D.s. However, it would be very unusual if the S.D. fell outside of the
range of 12-15. If we assume S.D.=15, then d = .77, and if S.D. = 12, d = .97. The effect is
clearly strong or very strong.
4. This group did not include the teaching of formal logic.
5. This group included the teaching of formal logic.
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